The 3 Cs of Myanmar's 2021 coup
By Sinmyung Park
Global Human Rights Hub Fellows Blog
It has been a year since Myanmar’s army launched a coup against the elected government of Nobel Peace laureate Aung San Suu Kyi. According to the figures given by the United Nations human rights office, at least 1,500 civilians have been killed in year-long protests and strikes against the military regime in Myanmar, and more than 8,000 people remain in unlawful custody. As the current situation in Myanmar is likely to remain in limbo for the foreseeable future, it becomes critical to consider what strategies the populace could adopt to weaken the military regime's power and influence in the post-coup Myanmar society. In other words, the question then arises as to what can be done to bring about changes in a notoriously closed, militarized state like Myanmar.
Given this context, I elaborate on three strategies that may be most effective in combating military violence and raising civic consciousness. I call these strategies the 3C approaches: 1) counter-offensives, 2) the civil disobedience movement, and 3) civil society organizations consisting of Myanmar nationals who reside in foreign countries, namely, transnational CSOs.
The first C of the 3C approaches corresponds to counter-offensives. I refer to Myanmar citizens' taking up arms to resist the military regime as a counter-offensive. For example, some civilians have reportedly joined ethnic armed organizations in Myanmar's borderlands and jungles, where ethnic minorities have long been battling the Myanmar army. Since February 2021, ethnic and civilian armies have been launching a series of assaults against military personnel. Consequently, the military regime has been confronting security challenges throughout the nation. Indeed, numerous analysts have asserted that the Myanmar army is strained to unprecedented levels. It has been reported that the military regime has sent traffic police from Yangon to the borderlands and brought in pro-military paramilitary groups into Yangon to hunt down urban rebels. Ethnic armed groups and the civilians joining them have been launching what Gramsci referred to as the war of maneuver, a revolutionary strategy to wage direct and confrontational battles against the ruling class. The counter-offensives being waged by ethnic armed groups and the civilians who have joined them clearly impede the mobility of the Myanmar army.
The second C corresponds to the civil disobedience movement (CDM), which offers ongoing nonviolent civil resistance in the streets of Myanmar. The CDM has become a nationwide phenomenon, with thousands of demonstrators participating in anti-junta protests around the country. The CDM, as an organized effort of ordinary citizens and local civil society groups, matches Gramsci's description of the war of position. Gramsci argued that the war of position necessitates immense sacrifices by infinite masses of people, and the war of maneuver would give way to the war of position for a revolution to succeed.
However, the present situation in Myanmar appears to be veering dramatically in the opposite direction. At first, the CDM was quite successful. Images of Myanmar citizens occupying the streets appeared across the Internet. The international community, including the United Nations, has expressed grave concern about human rights atrocities in Myanmar. However, Myanmar’s military-drafted Constitution legally justified the February coup, which meant that the coup was perceived as a mere political action conducted in a sovereign country. As a result, international action was improbable. Furthermore, after months of suppression by the military, the CDM's momentum had slowed down considerably. It was reported that Myanmar families that were fearful of arrest were cutting ties with their children involved in opposition to military authority, with announcements posted on the public media. Thus, the transition from a war of position to a war of maneuver appears to accurately describe the current situation in Myanmar.
The wars of maneuver and position must occur concurrently rather than asynchronously to guarantee a successful resistance. Thus, it is essential to consider how to empower the CDM's war of position to ensure continued, effective civil resistance. However, with military surveillance, the role of domestic civil society organizations is limited. That is, due to the limited mobility of domestic CSOs operating within the territory of Myanmar, paying attention to transnational Myanmar CSOs that are not bound by the military’s surveillance becomes critical.
The final C of the 3C approaches–transnational Myanmar CSOs operating globally–are reigniting the fading flames of Myanmar's war of position in two ways. To begin with, transnational Myanmar CSOs serve as influential political lobbying organizations that may persuade the government of their country of residence to consider offering humanitarian assistance to the Myanmar people for their struggle for democracy. For example, over 200 Burmese diaspora organizations, local CSOs in Myanmar, and transnational Myanmar CSOs from around the world sent a joint letter to members of Congress in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives recently, expressing their support for the introduction of the Burma Act 2021 and urging Congress to pass the bill.
Similarly, the French Senate voted on October 2021 to recognize Myanmar's deposed democratic National Unity Government (NUG) as the country's official and legal diplomatic channel. In both situations, transnational CSOs successfully pressured local and federal actors to support pro-NUG legislation. For example, the Campaign for a New Myanmar in Washington, D.C, and the Burmese American Democratic Alliance in San Francisco collaborated with several non-governmental organizations to launch a campaign called "Tell your members of Congress to co-sponsor the Burma Act of 2021". Comparably, Info Birmanie, a transnational Myanmar CSO based in Paris, influenced the French Senate's vote, and demanded the French corporation, Thales, to halt military technology exports to the Myanmar’s ruling military.
Furthermore, transnational Myanmar CSOs effectively channel financial assistance to CDM participants in Myanmar. Among the several transnational CSOs that have successfully solicited donations, Mutual Aid Myanmar deserves a special note. The group raised $700,000 and provided it to over 10,000 CDM participants in Myanmar. Because CDM members have left their jobs to join the demonstrations, the role of transnational CSOs such as Mutual Aid Myanmar is more vital than ever, as successful civic opposition often requires financial solidarity.
Summing up, it is crucial to realize that each of the 3C strategies—1) counter-offensives; 2) Myanmar's civil disobedience movement, and 3) transnational CSOs—plays a complementary role in the fight for democracy. Post-coup Myanmar society would be able to overturn the military’s illegitimate rule only when this constellation of strategies works in concert. Finally, I wish to conclude by emphasizing the international community's role in resolving the Myanmar crisis. That is, the war of position should occur not just inside Myanmar's borders but also in the international arena to pressure the Myanmar military to eventually surrender to grassroots demands for democracy. Though a collapse of the military regime any time soon is unlikely, the international community should consider adopting a far more proactive approach to the Myanmar problem and directing its available resources toward aiding the people of Myanmar in their fight for democracy.
Sinmyung Park
Global Human Rights Hub Fellow 2021-2022