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Global Human Rights Hub blog

From vulnerable to political: How Russian migrants navigate borders and belonging

By Gaukhar Baltabayeva | Spring 2026

Russian migrants fleeing intensified repression at home and opposing the war against Ukraine occupy an uncomfortable position in terms of security and humanitarian concerns in their receiving states. In my previous blog post, I examined how European Union member states, despite broadly restricting travel for Russian citizens, carve out exceptions for those who demonstrate a specific form of deservingness shaped by Europe’s ideological identity and security priorities. But suspicion toward Russian migrants was not limited to the liberal West. In this blog, I examine how Russian migrants navigate borders and demonstrate deservingness in the former Soviet context using the case of Georgia.

In the wake of the war in Ukraine, most Russian migrants were drawn to Central Asia and the South Caucasus—primarily Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Armenia—due to geographic proximity, ease of travel, and cultural familiarity (Hanson & Baltabayeva, 2024). These countries in Russia’s “near abroad” have absorbed hundreds of thousands of Russian migrants since February 2022, with numbers surging particularly after the mobilization announcement in September 2022. Their sudden, large-scale arrival, however, generated a complex local reception. The influx created not only demographic and infrastructural strain but also aggravated long-standing postcolonial grievances despite the fact that these post-Soviet states still maintain deep economic, political, and cultural ties with Moscow (Baltabayeva et al., forthcoming; Kurmanov et al., 2025).

Georgia offers a compelling example. Younger, pro-European segments of Georgian society tended to view Russian migrants as carriers of imperial attitudes, frequently accusing them of arrogance and a dismissive indifference to the local context, particularly to the 2008 war with Russia and the ongoing Russian occupation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the same time, broader public concerns also included economic competition, as many Russian migrants were young, highly skilled, and relatively affluent (Fieldwork, 2023). Despite this social friction, these concerns did not translate into immediate policy shifts. Georgia continued to welcome Russian migrants under its open-travel framework, carefully balancing the benefits of their presence with the need to manage a complex relationship with Russia, shaped by economic interdependence and a history of military conflict (Kakachia et al., 2025).

Liminal legality

Although visa-free, Georgia is far from being a “safe haven” for Russian migrants, especially those openly opposing their home country’s regime. First, most Russians exist in legal limbo. They are not refugees, nor are they quite residents. They are extended-stay visitors who need to cross borders once a year to renew their stay or obtain a residence permit through business registration or local employment, always aware that their status could change with a policy shift or diplomatic pressure. This liminal legal status functions both as a coping mechanism and a structural trap for both Russian migrants and the Georgian state. The absence of formal legal recognition allows Georgia to absorb large inflows of migrants without systematically granting residence permits or extending full legal protections to Russian dissidents through the asylum framework. In doing so, the government preserves political deniability vis-à-vis international audiences and allied regimes, carefully balancing its pro-European aspirations with its complex relationship with Russia. At the same time, the relatively open border regime facilitates the entry of mobile populations, including affluent Russian tourists and entrepreneurs, whose presence carries considerable economic benefits, a fact the Georgian government has publicly acknowledged. According to some accounts, Russian visitors top the list of foreign visitors to the country, with almost 190,000 individuals arriving in the first quarter of 2025, whereas in 2022, the Georgian Internal Affairs Ministry registered 1.5 million border crossings by Russian citizens. In addition, by 2024, Russian citizens had opened approximately 32,000 companies in the country, 80% of which were registered in the first two years after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[1]

Yet for opponents of the Russian regime seeking protection abroad, Georgia’s open-door policy comes at a high cost. While visitors may remain in the country for up to 365 days, the absence of formal legal status, such as temporary or permanent residency, creates economic precarity, social marginalization, and an inability to plan for the future (Baltabayeva et al., forthcoming). Moreover, there are growing reports of entry denials targeting Russian citizens who relied on “visa runs” to reset their permitted stay, among them pro-Ukrainian activists and independent journalists. Human rights defenders have interpreted this pattern as evidence of state cooperation with Russia in suppressing dissent, which creates additional risks for Russian migrants in the country and at the border.

Navigating borders and belonging

This institutional uncertainty, coupled with the uneasy local attitudes, shaped how Russian migrants present themselves and articulate their political identities. Often, Russian migrants faced so-called statistical discrimination in public spaces that required them to declare their anti-Putin positions. Walking along Tbilisi streets in the summer of 2024, I saw a neatly written sign at the door of a public vendor that read, “You are more than welcome here if you agree that Putin is a war criminal and respect the sovereignty of peaceful nations” (Fig. 1). Although without an addressee, it was clear that this message targeted those related to Putin’s regime, especially by their citizenship and nationality. This signpost exemplified the overall public sentiment regarding Russian migrants as being complicit in the military aggression in both Ukraine and Georgia. Thus, local residents imposed what Darieva et al. (2025) called “informal sanctions” against Russian migrants in places under their immediate control, such as cafes, bars, and rental properties.

Building exterior with a glass door, vines on brick walls, and outdoor seating.
Figure 1. A door to a public place in Tbilisi with a warning to Russians. Photo taken by the author. Tbilisi, Georgia, July 2024.

As a result, Russian migrants need to overcome suspicion at the Georgian border as well as at many other symbolic, linguistic, and ideological ‘borders’ created in urban spaces in Tbilisi by signposts, displays of Ukrainian and Georgian flags, and entry ‘rules’ like the one my Airbnb hosts detailed in the apartment listing (Fig. 2).

Popup box with text about guest policies for Russian citizens over a blurred map background.
Figure 2. Additional rules for booking an Airbnb in Tbilisi require Russian citizens to accept certain political claims. Photo taken by the author. Tbilisi, Georgia, July 2024.

At the Georgian border, Russian citizens need to signal a particular kind of profile: apolitical, economically self-sufficient, and entrepreneurial. Presenting oneself as a tourist, IT specialist, or investor reduces suspicion and aligns with Georgia’s interest in attracting mobile capital while avoiding overt political commitments. Once inside the country, however, the signaling requirements shift. As scholars note, in everyday interactions, Russian migrants frequently felt compelled to perform the role of the “good Russian”—someone who openly distances themselves from the Kremlin, condemns the war, and affirms support for democratic values and Ukrainian sovereignty. In other words, the depoliticization of one’s identity could facilitate entry into Georgia, whereas a visible democratic identity, often performed through anti-war and humanitarian activism, becomes key to mitigating public suspicion within the country.

Constructing a refugee

This public screening, constructed by pro-European Georgians in the country’s urban centers of Tbilisi and Batumi, echoes how Russian asylum seekers in Europe are expected to position themselves. However, the expectation that Russian migrants publicly perform a liberal, anti-Putin identity contrasts sharply with dominant asylum frameworks in the EU, which often construct refugees primarily as apolitical and inherently vulnerable subjects in need of protection.

As Freedman (2019) argues, EU asylum policy has increasingly relied on vulnerability classifications that treat vulnerability as an individual characteristic rather than a condition often produced by border externalization and restrictive migration regimes. Such frameworks tend to depoliticize claimants, curtailing their agency while positioning them as passive recipients of protection. Yet Russian asylum seekers frequently encounter the opposite demand: they need to demonstrate political agency by signaling explicit opposition to the regime and alignment with democratic values in order to establish moral legitimacy. This dynamic reflects what Golova (2025) identifies as “performance-based construction of deservingness,” examining the case of Germany’s humanitarian visa framework for Russian citizens, which has relevance well beyond that context.

This construction of deservingness exposes a tension within contemporary protection regimes. While vulnerability governance renders refugees as objects of humanitarian care, Russian migrants must actively perform political subjecthood to counter suspicion and claim social and institutional acceptance. Their worthiness is assessed not only through (physical) suffering but also through visible dissent. Crucially, the case of Georgia illustrates that this performance is demanded not only at the national border but also within the social fabric of the cities migrants arrive in, where, as seen in Tbilisi and Batumi, local communities act as informal gatekeepers, scrutinizing migrants’ political identities and moral positioning in everyday interactions. Refugee recognition, in this sense, operates at the intersection of vulnerability, geopolitics, and moral legitimacy, which is shaped as much by urban social landscapes as by institutional asylum procedures.

 

References

Baltabayeva, G. (2026, January 26). "Global politics of deservingness and the European Union’s humanitarian entry during the war in Ukraine." Global Human Rights Hub, Arizona State University. https://newcollege.asu.edu/global-human-rights-hub/fellows-program/ghr-fellows-blog/global-politics-of-deservingness

Baltabayeva, G., Hanson, M., Kitoshvili, N. (forthcoming). Limiting ties? Conflict proximity and Russian migration in Georgia and Kazakhstan.

Civil Georgia. (2024). "Russia Tops List of Georgia’s Visitors in Q1 2025—Geostat."https://civil.ge/archives/678792

Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA). (2023). "Influx sparks anti-Russian backlash in Georgia." https://cepa.org/article/influx-sparks-anti-russian-backlash-in-georgia/

Darieva, T., Vakhtangashvili, G., & Zimmermann, P. (2025). Informal Sanctions and Patriotism From Below: Georgian-Russian Encounters in Tbilisi’s Housing Market in 2022. Nationalities Papers, 53(6), 1332–1348. doi:10.1017/nps.2025.10067

Freedman, J. (2019). The uses and abuses of "vulnerability" in EU asylum and refugee protection: Protecting women or reducing autonomy? Papeles del CEIC (1). https://addi.ehu.es/handle/10810/41837

Gavrilova, S. (2025, February 7). "Beyond the 'Good Russian' – Rethinking Exile and Engagement."The Russia File.Kennan Institute, the Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/beyond-good-russian-rethinking-exile-and-engagement

Georgia Today. (2024). "Russian Interests Section warns citizens of possible entry refusals when traveling to Georgia." https://georgiatoday.ge/russian-interests-section-warns-citizens-of-possible-entry-refusals-when-traveling-to-georgia/

Golova, T. (2025). Migration assistance activism and the German humanitarian visa: framing deservingness, enacting solidarity. Post-Soviet Affairs, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2025.2564044

Hanson, M., & Baltabayeva, G. (2025). Exit as voice, for the economically mobile: Russian migration to Central Asia & the Caucasus. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 51(9), 2393–2414. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2024.2406359

Jamestown Foundation. (2023). "Russians open record number of businesses in Georgia amid war in Ukraine." https://jamestown.org/russians-open-record-number-businesses-in-georgia-amid-war-in-ukraine/

JAMnews. (2023). "Activist denied entry to Georgia." https://jam-news.net/%D0%B0ctivist-denied-entry-to-georgia/

Kakachia, K., Minesashvili, S., Kandelaki, S., & Lebanidze, B. (2025). Contested Securitisation of Migration in the Post-Soviet Space: The Case of Russian Migrants in Georgia. The International Spectator, 60(2), 114–129. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2025.2482593

Kurmanov, B., Smith, B., Schenk, C. (2025). Finding Space for Activism: Understanding Youth Activists in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the Wake of Russia’s War Against Ukraine. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1525/cpcs.2025.2635216

Le Pavic, G., & Korableva, E. (2025). Humanitarian, linguistic and narrative bordering in Georgia: migrations in the context of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Eurasian Geography and Economics, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2025.2516839

OVD-Info. (2023). "Transnational repression of the Russian Federation: Threats, tendencies, solutions." https://reports.ovd.info/en/transnational-repression-russian-federation-threats-tendencies-solutions#1

Reporters Without Borders (RSF). (2024). "Georgia quietly denying entry to independent Russian journalists." https://rsf.org/en/georgia-quietly-denying-entry-independent-russian-journalists


About Gaukhar Baltabayeva

Gaukhar Baltabayeva is a PhD candidate in political science in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. Her research examines migration, exile politics and transnational activism, with a focus on Russian citizens who left the country following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Through her dissertation and published scholarship, Gaukhar explores the civic and political engagement of Russian migrants across the South Caucasus and European Union, contributing to broader discussions on migration and resistance under authoritarianism.

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